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PERFECT PITCH: HOW U.S. SPORTS FINANCING AND RECRUITING 
MODELS CAN RESTORE HARMONY BETWEEN FIFA AND THE EU
Christine Snyder*
When the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the 
world governing body for football, announced its plan to implement a new 
rule restricting the number of foreign players eligible to play for club teams 
the world over, the European Union took notice. Prior court rulings on a 
similar rule found that such a rule conflicts with the protection for the free 
movement of workers under the EC Treaty. Despite this conflict, the Presi-
dent of FIFA pressed forward, citing three main justifications for implemen-
tation of the new rule. This Note examines each of those justifications and 
proposes alternative solutions based on U.S. financing and recruiting mod-
els which will not conflict with the essential protections of the EC Treaty.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Sports is like war without the killing.”1 These words ring true to-
day as a battle brews over the state of European football.2 The epicenter of 
this battle is the top league pitches in Europe.3 There is a good reason why 
the European football leagues are the focus of so much attention; that is 
where the money is. Clubs in the English Premier League (EPL), the top 
level football league in England, are among the biggest earning clubs in the 
world,4
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and English football accounts for one-fourth of the total revenue for 
1 This quote is from American Entrepreneur Ted Turner. ThinkExist.com, Ted Turner 
Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/sports_is_like_a_war_without_the_killing/225391.
html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
2 In this Note, “football” refers to the sport known as “soccer” in the U.S.
3 “Pitch” is the name given to the field on which football is played.
4 DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, LOST IN TRANSLATION: FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE (Feb. 
2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/UK_SBG_Deloitte
FML2009.pdf (listing the 2007-2008 revenue for the EPL “big four” clubs as: Manchester 
United £257.1, Chelsea £212.9, Arsenal £209.3, Liverpool £167.0).
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football in Europe.5 Italian League Serie A is not far behind England, and 
France’s Ligue 1, Spain’s La Liga, and Germany’s Bundesliga round out the 
“big five” leagues that dominate the football world.6
This financial dominance is the reason Europe recently became a 
battleground between the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) and the European Commission (EC).7 The battle began when FIFA 
proposed measures that would limit the number of foreign players who can 
be on a pitch to five.8 Currently, there is no limit to the number of foreign 
players permitted to start for a club. The other six spots on the pitch must go 
to players who are eligible for the national team of the country in which the 
team is located.9
FIFA’s new “6+5 Rule” is reminiscent of a similar rule that the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) held violated the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Community (EC Treaty).10 Despite this conflict, FIFA President 
Sepp Blatter plans to forge ahead with the plan to implement the 6+5 Rule, 
believing that the problems facing football today justify the Rule and that it 
is only a matter of time and effort to convince the EC of the error of its 
ways.11 In the face of Blatter’s determination, the EC has pushed back 
stressing its strict adherence to the principles of the EC Treaty and threaten-
ing action against any club that tests its resolve.12
5 Press Release, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Premier League Clubs’ Profits are Set to Double 
(May 31, 2007), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/
Caught in the middle is 
0,1014,sid%253D2834%2526cid%253D159168,00.html (listing the total revenue of the 
European market at £8.7 billion in 2006 with £1.4 billion generated from the EPL).
6 Id. (listing the top leagues in Italy at £1.0 billion, Germany at £0.8 billion, Spain at £0.8 
billion, and France at £0.6 billion).
7 FIFA is the world governing and regulatory body for all professional football leagues 
and clubs. See Europa.eu, Institutions and Bodies of the European Union, European Com-
mission, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm (stating “The Commis-
sion proposes EU legislation and checks it is properly applied across the EU. Works in the 
interests of the EU as a whole.”).
8 FIFA.com, About FIFA, Blatter: ‘6+5’ Rule Is Crucial, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
federation/president/news/newsid=762500.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
9 Id.
10 Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n (ASBL) v. Bosman, 
1995 E.C.R. I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995) (holding that football quotas based on nationali-
ty violate the freedom of movement and anti-discrimination requirements of Article 39 (ex 
48) of the EC Treaty). CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325) 33 (incorporating changes made under the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Treaty of Nice) [herei-
nafter EC Treaty]. The EC Treaty’s incorporations altered the numbers of several article 
numbers, so older Article numbers will be included in parentheses in the text.
11 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
12 EU Threatens FIFA with Legal Action, IRISH TIMES, May 28, 2008 (pagination unavail-
able), http://www.irishtimes.com/sports/soccer/2008/0528/1211830532337.html (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2009).
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the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) which, as a member 
of FIFA, must implement FIFA mandates, but as an organization operating 
in Europe, must also adhere to European Union (EU) law.13 The battle is 
coming to a head as the first phase of FIFA’s plan is scheduled for the 
2010–2011 season.14
This Note will evaluate Blatter’s justifications for the 6+5 Rule, 
demonstrate how the 6+5 Rule will do little to solve the problems Blatter 
argues are facing football today, and propose solutions based on successful 
practices in the U.S. Part II discusses the background leading up to the cur-
rent conflict by examining the applicable provisions of the EC Treaty, the 
relevant cases applying those provisions to sports, and the significant details 
of the current stand-off between the EU and FIFA. Part III scrutinizes the 
three concerns FIFA uses as justification for the proposed 6+5 Rule and 
argues that one of these concerns is invalid, and the other two, while valid, 
do not find relief under the 6+5 Rule. Part III also explains how FIFA’s 
argument that sports should be exempt from the EU’s principles of free 
movement of workers and anti-discrimination is unsupportable. Part IV 
outlines solutions proposed by others that fail to adequately solve the prob-
lems facing European football today. Finally, Part V proposes a framework 
of regulations based on American sports that will address FIFA’s concerns 
while staying within the scope of the EC Treaty. 
II. BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT CONFLICT
A. Freedom of Movement of Workers and Non-Discrimination 
Principles In the EU
In order to understand the current conflict between the EU and 
FIFA, it is necessary to grasp the goals of the EC Treaty and the freedoms it 
protects. In the Preamble to the EC Treaty, the framers of the EC Treaty 
“[r]esolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by 
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.”15 Article 2 
of the EC Treaty establishes the principle that in order to accomplish its 
goals, the European Community must “promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious, balanced, and sustainable development of economic activities 
. . . .”16
13 Bruce A. Caldow, Six + Five=?, J. L. SOC’Y SCOT. 58 (2006), available at http://www.
journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/53-6/1005383.aspx.
In order to do so, the EC Treaty recognizes the necessity to establish 
14 EurActiv.com, Euro Cup Kicks Off Amid EU-FIFA Dispute (June 6, 2008), http://
www.euractiv.com/en/sports/euro-cup-kicks-amid-eu-fifa-dispute/article-173131?Ref=RSS 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Euro Cup].
15 EC Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl.
16 Id. art. 2.
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the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.17 Under the free 
movement of persons element, Article 39 (ex 48) deals with the free move-
ment of workers.18 Specifically, Article 39 (ex 48) states that “[the] freedom 
of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on natio-
nality between workers . . . . ”19
In order to enforce the provisions of the EC Treaty, the EU estab-
lished the ECJ. The ECJ’s function is to interpret the EC Treaty and ensure 
that its provisions are followed within the EU Member States.20 Since its 
establishment, the EC Treaty has governed activities in Member States, but 
for a time it was unclear just how the principles inherent in the EC Treaty 
applied to sports. Several ECJ cases clarify the appropriate application of 
the EC Treaty in sports and establish the EU’s regulatory control over the 
sporting world.21
B. Application of EC Treaty Principles to Sports
Before cases emerged to establish EU regulatory control over 
sports, football leagues in Europe operated under UEFA’s 3+2 Rule which 
dictated that clubs could field no more than three foreign players from other 
Member States plus an additional two foreign players who have “assimi-
lated” as a result of their length of play in the club team’s State.22
17 See Andrew L. Lee, The Bosman Case: Protecting Freedom of Movement in European 
Football, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1255, 1264 (1996). See also EC Treaty, supra note 10.
Under this 
system, teams distinguished players and limited their play based on natio-
nality. A series of three cases established the appropriate application of the 
EC Treaty in sports and invalidated player restrictions based on nationality. 
The first two, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and 
Dona v. Mantero, paved the way for the third case, Union Royale Belge des 
Sociétés de Football Association (ASBL) v. Bosman, to finally invalidated 
the 3+2 Rule.
18 EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 39.
19 Id. art. 39(2).
20 See Lee, supra note 17, at 1275; see also EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 234. See also 
Europa.com, The EU at a Glance, European Countries, http://europa.eu/abc/european_
countries/index_en.htm (listing the twenty-seven member states as: Austria, Belgium, Bulga-
ria, Cypres, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungry, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemborg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
21 See Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass’n Union Cycliste Int’l, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 1 C.M.L.R. 
320 (1974); Case 13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 2 C.M.L.R. 578 (1976); Case 
415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n (ASBL) v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R.
I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995).
22 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 1287. 
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The first case to link the freedom of movement of workers and anti-
discrimination provisions of Article 39 (ex 48) of the EC Treaty to sports in 
Europe was Walrave.23 Walrave concerned two Dutch citizens who wished 
to work as pacemakers for motorcycle racing teams from other Member 
States but were prohibited from doing so by cyclist union rules.24 The ECJ 
in Walrave ruled that sport falls within the realm of Article 2 of the EC 
Treaty in that it “constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of 
Article 2 . . . .”25 Therefore, Article 39’s rules against discrimination based 
on nationality apply in the context of sports.26
Similarly, the ECJ applied the EC Treaty provisions to European 
football in Dona v. Mantero.27 In Dona, the ECJ scrutinized Italian Football 
Federation rules that restricted play to only Italian nationals.28 The court 
held that these rules, which discriminated based on nationality, were incon-
sistent with Article 39 (ex 48) of the EC Treaty.29
In both of these cases, it is important to note that the ECJ carved out 
an exception for sporting activities that are of a “purely [ ] sporting interest”
and not economic in nature.30 This exception was meant to protect national 
teams organized to compete in international competitions like the World 
Cup or the Olympics.31
While Walrave and Dona provided the groundwork for the ECJ to 
extend the provisions of the EC Treaty into the sporting world, the Bosman
case changed the face of European football. In Bosman, Belgian national 
football player Jean-Marc Bosman challenged the validity of the football 
transfer system after his Belgian club and the French national association 
blocked his transfer to a French club.32 As a result, Bosman was left without 
a club in either country and forced to sit out for a year of play.33 Bosman
single-handedly upset the way European leagues operated.34
23 Walrave, 1 C.M.L.R. at 320.
First, it invali-
24 Lee, supra note 17, at 1287; Walrave, 1 C.M.L.R. at 321.
25 Walrave, 1 C.M.L.R. at 334.  See also EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 2.
26 Walrave, 1 C.M.L.R. at 334.
27 Case 13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 2 C.M.L.R. 578 (1976) [hereinafter 
Dona].
28 Lee, supra note 17, at 1287.
29 Dona, 2 C.M.L.R. at 588.
30 Lee, supra note 17, at 1288–89.
31 See Commission White Paper on Sport, at 4.2, COM (2007) 391 final (July 11, 2007) 
[hereinafter White Paper] (listing an exception for “[t]he right to select national athletes for 
national team competitions.”).
32 See id. at 1291–92. See also Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football 
Ass’n (ASBL) v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995).
33 See Lee, supra note 17, at 1290. See also Bosman, 1 C.M.L.R. at 648.
34 See Lee, supra note 17, at 1290. 
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dated the system that European clubs were using to transfer players by rul-
ing that the transfer system violated the freedom of movement of players.35
Secondly, the ECJ ruled that the rules regarding the permissible number of 
foreign players constituted discrimination based on nationality and was also 
a violation of Article 39 (ex 48) of the EC Treaty.36 In his opinion, Advo-
cate General Lenz stated that the rules in the Bosman case “represent[ed] an 
absolutely classic case of discrimination” and Article 39 (ex 48) prohibited
these rules “in so far as they relate[ed] to nationals of other Member 
States.”37
The Bosman decision sent shockwaves through the football world, 
but the ECJ was not finished.38 While Walrave, Dona, and Bosman only 
applied to individuals who were nationals of other Member States under the 
EC Treaty, another series of rulings took the principles established in Bos-
man and applied them to nationals of non-Member countries.39 The EU 
found a way to extend the Bosman principles to non-EU nationals through 
the numerous Association and Cooperation Agreements between the EU 
and non-Member States.40 These agreements often contain provisions re-
quiring non-discrimination in employment.41 Recognizing that application 
of the EC Treaty’s non-discrimination principles under these agreements 
was an unresolved issue, the Commission announced that these Agreements 
extend the non-discrimination protections of the EC Treaty to non-EU na-
tionals.42 Not all sports organizations embraced this announcement.43 As a 
result of their reluctance, a few non-EU nationals turned to the courts to 
enforce this extension.44
35 See id. See also Bosman, 1 C.M.L.R. at 648.
36 Lee, supra note 17, at 1290–91. See also Bosman, 1 C.M.L.R. at 648.
37 William Duffy, Note, Football May Be Ill, but Don’t Blame Bosman, 10 SPORTS LAW. J.
295, 306 (2003) (citing Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n (ASBL) v. Bos-
man, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645, 693 (1995)).
38 See Jesse Gary, Note, The Demise of Sport? The Effect of Judicially Mandated Free 
Agency on European Football and American Baseball, 38 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 293, 295 
(2005) (discussing the fallout of the Bosman decision).
39 See Malaja v. Fédération Française de Basket-Ball, La Cour Administrative d´Appel de 
Nancy (Première Chambre), No. 99NC00282, 2000 R.T.D. Eur. (2000). See also Case C-
438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Maros Kolpak, 2003 E.C.R. I-4135.
40 David W. Penn, Note, From Bosman to Simutenkov: The Application of Non-
Discrimination Principles to Non-EU Nationals in European Sports, 30 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 203, 217 (2006).
41 Id. at 217–18.
42 Id. at 218.
43 Id.
44 Penn, supra note 40 at 218. See also Malaja, No. 99NC00282, 2000 R.T.D. Eur. (2000). 
See also Kolpak, E.C.R. I-4135.
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In Malaja v. Fédération Française de Basket-Ball, the Conseil 
d’État, France’s highest court, ruled that Bosman’s anti-discrimination pro-
hibition extended to a Polish female basketball player because Poland’s 
1991 Association Agreement with the EU contained an anti-discrimination 
clause.45 In turn, this decision also extended the same protections to other 
countries who had signed similar agreements.46
Taking it one step further, the ECJ later extended the anti-
discrimination protections to cover agreements that did not contain express 
provisions. In Deutscher Handballbund e.V. v. Maros Kolpak, a Slovakian 
goalkeeper for a German handball team challenged a German Handball As-
sociation rule that limited the number of permitted non-EU team members 
to two.47 Kolpak pointed to an Association Agreement between the EU and 
Slovakia and argued that he should have the same privileges as other EU 
players.48 The ECJ ruled that even when Association Agreements did not 
contain specific provisions guaranteeing protection from discrimination 
based on nationality, discrimination protection was automatically included 
because “the Agreement reflected the same aim and spirit of Article 48 of 
the Treaty of Rome.”49 This interpretation is certainly in keeping with one 
of the overarching goals expressed in the Preamble to the EC Treaty. The 
Preamble expresses that one of the goals of the EC Treaty is to “confirm the 
solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring . . . to 
ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations.”50
C. The Current Conflict Between FIFA and the EU: A Step Back 
from Bosman
Through this series of cases, 
the European courts met their goal and ensured the same rights for non-EU 
nationals that were established in Bosman for citizens of the EU. 
Despite the ECJ ruling in Bosman and the subsequent extension of 
EC Treaty discrimination protection to non-EU nationals, FIFA is currently 
proposing to implement a rule that would again institute a nationality based 
quota system in football. FIFA is the world governing and regulatory body 
45 Penn, supra note 40 at 218–19. Malaja v. Fédération Française de Basket-Ball, La Cour 
Administrative d´Appel de Nancy (Première Chambre), No. 99NC00282, 2000 R.T.D. Eur., 
at 4 (2000).
46 Penn, supra note 40 at 219.
47 See Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Maros Kolpak, 2003 E.C.R. I-4135, 
¶ 11.
48 Penn, supra note 40 at 220. See also Kolpak, E.C.R. I-4135, ¶ 11.
49 Penn, supra note 40 at 221. See also Kolpak, E.C.R. I-4135, ¶ 49; EC Treaty, supra note 
10, art. 39.
50 EC Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl. 
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for professional football.51 It governs through a hierarchy of associations, 
leagues, and teams.52 First, FIFA is comprised of confederations that govern 
national associations.53 These national associations govern the leagues in 
their respective countries, and those leagues govern the activities of the in-
dividual club teams within those leagues.54 Finally, the players are the re-
sponsibility of the club teams.55
One such rule is FIFA’s proposed 6+5 Rule which requires that 
when a match begins, each league team must have six players on the pitch 
who are eligible for the national team of the country in which the league 
team is located.
Under this hierarchy, the teams follow the 
rules handed down by their leagues, and these rules often flow through the 
national associations and the confederations from the top at FIFA. As a re-
sult, a rule passed by FIFA must be implemented by all of its confederations 
including UEFA whose national associations, leagues, and clubs operate in 
the EU. 
56 For example, Manchester United, the English Premier 
League’s (EPL) top performing team for the 2007–2008 season, would need 
to begin each match with six English players on the pitch. FIFA’s proposed 
6+5 Rule will be implemented in stages requiring four national players for 
the 20102011 season, five national players for the 20112012 season, and, 
finally, six national players for the start of the 20122013 season.57
The EU responded by warning FIFA that its proposed rule would 
conflict with Bosman.58 On May 28, 2008, the EC announced that it would 
take legal action if necessary to enforce the ECJ’s prior ruling.59 Vladimir 
Špidla, EC Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Oppor-
tunities, stated that the announcement was equivalent to the Commission 
showing “the red card to the FIFA 6+5 rule.”60
51 See Thomas M. Schiera, Note, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow 
European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance That It Helped Destroy?, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 709, 712 (2007). See also FIFA.com, About FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/
The Commission made this 
aboutfifa/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
52 Schiera, supra note 51, at 712.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 712–13.
55 See id.
56 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
57 Euro Cup, supra note 14. 
58 IRISH TIMES, supra note 12 (discussing how the proposed rule violates Bosman’s ruling 
against discrimination of workers based on nationality).
59 Id.
60 EurActiv.com, FIFA Shown EU ‘Red Card’ Over Player Quotas, (May 29, 2008), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sports/fifa-shown-eu-red-card-player-quotas/article-172786 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2009) (comparing the issuance of a red card in football—which is the high-
est penalty that a player can receive on the field and requires the player to immediately exit 
the game—to the Commission’s holding on the 6+5 Rule).
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announcement, its strongest warning yet, the day before FIFA Congress’s 
annual meeting in Australia.61
Despite the Commission’s strong opposition to the proposed 6+5 
Rule, Mr. Špidla said that he could support UEFA’s alternate plan, the 
Home-Grown Rule, in an apparent attempt to reach an acceptable compro-
mise with FIFA.62 Under the Home-Grown Rule, league teams would have 
to maintain a specific number of players on their rosters who have been 
locally trained. 63 Players can be from any nation, and, as long as the league 
teams have enrolled these players in local training programs for a set period 
of time, then the players are eligible for roster spots on European teams;64
therefore, this rule seems to not violate the principles of free movement 
contained in the EC Treaty because it does not use nationality as a factor in 
determining player eligibility.65 Since the Home-Grown Rule does not dis-
criminate based on nationality, as specifically prohibited in Bosman, the 
Commission said it would back the Home-Grown Rule, but the Commission 
expressly warned that implementation of the 6+5 Rule would not be consis-
tent with the EC Treaty.66
Despite the Commission’s strong warning, FIFA President Sepp 
Blatter said he would proceed as planned with the proposed 6+5 Rule. 67
Following Blatter’s lead, FIFA’s Congress met the following day on May 
30, 2008 and voted to support the 6+5 Rule by a vote of one hundred and 
fifty-five to five with forty members abstaining.68 Blatter also expressed his 
belief that FIFA would ultimately prevail in convincing the EU to back his 
6+5 Rule, saying that “[w]e have good arguments to convince those in Eu-
rope” and “I’m sure it will be done.”69 As for the Home-Grown Rule, Blat-
ter dismissed it as having “one major shortcoming” in that it does not pro-
tect players based on nationality, the very issue that makes his 6+5 Rule 
violate the EC Treaty.70
In order to try and bridge the divide between FIFA and the EU, Eu-
ropean Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering met with both Blatter and 
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 See id. 
65 See id.
66 IRISH TIMES, supra note 12. 
67 Id.
68 Dan Baynes, Blatter’s Quota Plan, Facing EU Wall, Backed by FIFA,
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&
sid=agFtAePM06RY (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
69 Id.
70 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
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Michel Platini, UEFA’s President, on June 5, 2008.71 Prior to the meeting, 
Blatter expressed hope that the meeting would yield positive results.72 Blat-
ter’s position relied heavily on FIFA’s argument that there should be a legal 
exception for sport, but French EU official Guy Bono stated that “[e]ven if 
the treaty recognised the uniqueness of football, it doesn’t mean that foot-
ball is above the law or treaties . . . .”73 The meeting failed to produce any 
agreement, and UEFA found itself stuck squarely in the middle. The day 
after the meeting, UEFA spokesman William Gaillard said, “[w]e are in 
favour of protecting locally trained players, but six plus five, or any other 
form of quotas, simply cannot be implemented in Europe because it isn’t 
legal.”74
III. BLATTER’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 6+5 RULE
With both the EU expressing strong determination to safeguard its 
position and FIFA determined to press ahead, the conflict has reached a 
standoff. 
Part of the reason for the current conflict between FIFA and the EU 
is Blatter’s implacable belief that there are strong utilitarian justifications 
for the 6+5 Rule and that these justifications outweigh the negative legal 
implications for the rule. Blatter advances three reasons supporting that the 
6+5 Rule is necessary to save football as the dominant world sport: (1) the 
breakdown of fan identity; (2) the need to avoid uneven competition and 
economic monopolization; and (3) the lack of development of local players. 
In addition, Blatter makes a broader argument that there should be a general 
exception to EC Treaty provisions for sports.
A. Blatter’s First Justification: The Breakdown of Fan Identity
Blatter argues that the proposed 6+5 Rule would address a break-
down in fan identity.75 In his view, fans must be able to identify with the 
players on the pitch or they will not attend games.76 He fears that without 
the implementation of the 6+5 rule, fans’ ability to identify with the players 
on their local teams will completely disappear.77
71 Euro Cup, supra note 14. 
As a result, he argues that 
72 Baynes, supra note 68 (quoting Mr. Blatter as stating “We have good arguments to 
convince those in Europe that they shall also perhaps look at solidarity . . . . I’m sure it will 
be done.”). 
73 Euro Cup, supra note 14. 
74 Caldow, supra note 13. 
75 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
76 See id.
77 See id.
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fans will no longer attend games or support teams if they do not see players 
on the pitch that hail from their nations and communities.78
While it is true that since Bosman there has been a substantial in-
crease in the “migration of athletes within and into the European Union,”
this does not necessarily affect fans’ ability to identify with their local 
teams.79 Team identity is based on “the community’s sense of belonging 
and pride.”80 For example, a fan from Liverpool loves Liverpool Football 
Club because Liverpool is where he grew up, and Liverpool is the team he 
loved since he was a child. The nationalities of the players on the team are 
irrelevant because “[f]ans tend to adopt good players as their own, regard-
less of origin.”81 In addition, evidence indicates that fan interest has not 
declined despite the arrival of foreign players.82
Blatter’s fear that fans’ ability to identify with their teams will be 
destroyed unless FIFA implements the 6+5 Rule also discounts another 
strong phenomenon. The influx of foreign players into European leagues 
may help clubs draw new fans from around the world. For example, when a 
young, talented player like Didier Drogba from Ivory Coast makes it onto 
the first team for Chelsea, one of the most successful teams in the world, 
every set of eyes in the Ivory Coast is glued to the television screen when he 
takes the field. Chelsea has expanded its fan base to the tune of a small na-
tion’s population. This world following is a large part of the reason why 
leagues like the EPL are the most successful leagues in the world.83 The 
addition of top foreign players has added strength of talent and excitement 
to these leagues and has drawn fans interested in seeing the best play in the 
world.84
The influx of foreign talent in European leagues also helps players 
from non-EU nations that do not have well-developed football systems
reach their full potential. A player like Drogba would have little hope of 
garnering attention from international fans if there were fewer opportunities 
for foreign players to move to the top clubs of the world. Fewer spots for 
78 See id.
79 See Blair Downey, The Bosman Ruling: European Soccer—Above the Law?, 1 ASPER 
REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 187, 193 (2001) (Eng.).
80 Id.
81 Lindsey V. Briggs, Note, UEFA v. The European Community: Attempts of the Govern-
ing Body of European Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and Antidiscrimina-
tion Labor Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439, 444 (2005).
82 English Football Clubs Rake in $3.4 Billion, CNN.COM, June 4, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/SPORT/football/06/04/football.deloitte/index.html.
83 See Ian Blackshaw, Opinion Foreign Players Quotas in Football Teams, T.M.C. ASSER 
INSTITUUT, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?textid=36171 (last visited Sept. 
28, 2009).
84 See id.
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foreign players would mean that teams would take fewer chances on players 
like Drogba, and the world may have lost its opportunity to discover and 
showcase the 2006 African Player of the Year.85
Finally, Blatter’s first justification for his proposed rule—the 
breakdown of fan identity—overlooks one major reality of football. Team 
identity based on the nationality of the players on the pitch exists in another 
important realm: national competitions. The largest and most watched foot-
ball competition in the world is the World Cup, held every four years. In the 
World Cup, teams compete based on nationality, like the Olympics. The EU 
has carved out narrow exceptions to its freedom of movement of workers 
and anti-discrimination principles for these competitions because these 
competitions are not economic in nature.
In essence, the current 
structure of football helps develop the skills and opportunities for players 
from foreign countries with weaker football institutions. This potential to 
develop such players would be lost or severely crippled under the proposed 
6+5 Rule. 
86
In addition, Blatter’s fear of the breakdown of fan identity may in-
advertently injure the popularity of the World Cup. If Blatter’s 6+5 Rule 
succeeds in “nationalizing” club teams to a large extent, fans may not be as 
interested in watching national teams compete in the World Cup since it 
would be essentially the same competitions they watch on a regular basis. 
This would be particularly ironic considering the World Cup is a FIFA 
sponsored competition.
Blatter’s rule is unnecessary for 
this reason. Fans do not need Blatter’s rule to ensure that they can identify 
with the nationality of the players for their local club teams since they al-
ready have a successful and popular venue to watch teams comprised exclu-
sively of national players compete. 
87
B. Blatter’s Second Justification: Uneven Competition / Economic 
Monopoly
Blatter’s second reason for believing that the 6+5 Rule is necessary 
to save football is that since Bosman, the game has suffered as a result of 
the economic impact on the business of European football. Wages have 
drastically increased since Bosman, which has increased operating costs for 
85 Didier Drogba, 2006 African Player of the Year, WORLD CUP CORNER, Mar. 2, 2007, 
http://www.worldcupcorner.com/2007/03/didier-drogba-2006-african-player-of-the-year (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2009).
86 See White Paper, supra note 31 (listing the restrictions as “[t]he right to select national 
athletes for national team competitions; [t]he need to limit the number of participants in a 
competition; [t]he setting of deadlines for transfers of players in team sports.”).
87 See FIFA.com, FIFA World Cup, 2010 Fifa World Cup South Africa, http://www.
fifa.com/worldcup/index.html.
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club teams.88 This has broadened the divide between teams, creating a few 
dominant clubs and leaving the rest with little or no hope of effectively 
competing, economically or athletically, with those dominant clubs.89 Blat-
ter argues that this has created a situation where a “minority of clubs control 
everything—money, players, and means.”90 He argues that his proposed 
rule is necessary to restore competitive balance, a goal of the EC Treaty.91
Blatter is correct that there is an imbalance of power between teams 
in the top leagues in Europe. Bosman’s ruling “liberalized player move-
ment” and caused players’ salaries to dramatically increase.92 This, in turn, 
forced clubs to pay higher salaries to acquire and retain the top players, 
enabling a few rich clubs to monopolize the top players.93 In the EPL, the 
top four spots are consistently held by four dominant clubs, Manchester 
United, Chelsea, Arsenal, and Liverpool.94 The dominance of these clubs is 
best illustrated by Arsenal’s 20032004 season, when the team did not lose 
a single game in its thirty-eight game season.95
88 Downey, supra note 79, at 192 (citing D. Anderson, Premiership Clubs Facing Doubt-
ful Financial Future, YORKSHIRE POST, Nov. 18, 1999 (pagination unavailable)).
The other sixteen teams 
have little hope of ever breaking into this elite group because they simply 
cannot buy the talent they need to compete athletically. The frustration for 
these lower clubs was best expressed by former Newcastle Manager Kevin 
Keegan in an interview with the press when he said, “[w]hat I can say to the 
Newcastle fans is that we will be trying to get fifth and we will be trying to 
win the other league that’s going on within the Premier League. I haven’t 
got enough money and I wouldn’t be able to get the players anyway (to do 
89 See Schiera, supra note 51, at 710.
90 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
91 Id. (quoting Mr. Blatter as stating “the ‘6+5’ rule supports another European Law, 
namely regarding having the broadest and fairest possible competition and restricting the 
concentration of finances and economic monopolies”).
92 Schiera, supra note 51, at 718 (citing Stratis Camatsos, European Sports, the Transfer 
System and Competition Law: Will They Ever Find a Competitive Balance?, 12 SPORTS LAW.
J. 155, 178 (2005) (citing Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n
(ASBL) v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645, 648 (1995)).
93 Schiera, supra note 51, at 718.
94 Id. at 719.
95 Id. at 720 (citing Premiership Standings—2003/04, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/tables?
league=ENG.1&season=2003&column=none&order=false&cc=5901 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2009)).
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any better than that) . . . .”96 Blatter is correct that football in Europe is a 
“society of haves and have nots.”97
Blatter points to the economic disparity between teams to justify the 
application of his 6+5 Rule, and argues that another provision of the EC 
Treaty requires the implementation of the rule to protect the “broadest and 
fairest possible competition” and restrict “the concentration of finances and 
economic monopolies.”98 The other law that he refers to is Article 82 (ex 
86) of the EC Treaty which prohibits “any abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial 
part of it . . . .”99
First, while Blatter points to one provision of the EC Treaty that is 
designed to protect fair competition, he ignores the fact that his plan violates 
Article 81 (ex 85) of the EC treaty. Article 81 (ex 85) is divided into three 
sections. Article 81(1) outlines prohibited actions, Article 81(2) makes those 
actions “automatically void,” and Article 81(3) provides a few narrow ex-
ceptions that would allow prohibited actions to continue.
However, Blatter’s clinging to unfair competition as justi-
fication for his 6+5 Rule is flawed for two reasons. 
100 Article 81(1) 
prohibits agreements or decisions by undertakings or associations that “have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market . . . .”101 The 6+5 Rule, supported and im-
plemented by FIFA, an association, would fall under the scope of Article 
81(1) since it is an agreement by the association to restrict competition; 
therefore, Article 81(2) would make FIFA’s 6+5 Rule automatically void. 
The only way the rule could still survive is if it fits the exception under Ar-
ticle 81(3), which makes Article 81(1) inapplicable to any agreement that 
promotes “technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit . . . .”102
Under the Article 81(3) exception, Blatter could argue that even 
though his 6+5 Rule restricts competition, it benefits the sport economically 
by restoring balance in competition, which benefits fans. While this seems 
to be a persuasive argument, agreements that violate Article 81(1) but have 
economic benefits satisfying Article 81(3) are still invalid unless they are 
“indispensible to the attainment of these objectives [under Article 
96 Power of Top Four Concerns Keegan, BBC SPORT, May 6, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
sport2/hi/football/teams/n/newcastle_united/7384247.stm (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
97 See Schiera, supra note 51, at 721 (citing Joseph Blatter, Greed Threatens the Beautiful 
Game, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at 19 (discussing how Blatter suggests the setting of limits 
on player salaries)).
98 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
99 EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 82.
100 Id. art. 81.
101 Id. art. 81(1).
102 Id. art. 81(3).
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81(3)(a)].”103 This is where Blatter’s argument breaks down. European 
courts have applied a balancing test to determine if an action meets the Ar-
ticle 81(3) exception, and “restrictions are allowed to stand if the benefits 
created outweigh the restrictions in competition.”104 In applying this test, a 
court examines not only the benefits for consumers—in this case fans—but 
also if “the restrictions in question are the least restrictive means of creating 
such benefits.”105
Another essential flaw in Blatter’s proposed solution to the unfair 
competition problem in the European leagues is that his 6+5 Rule will not 
solve the economic imbalance between clubs. The court in Bosman recog-
nized that rules on foreign players do “nothing to prevent the affluent clubs 
from acquiring the best national players, which would undermine the com-
petitive balance despite the foreign player rules.”
As long as there is any other feasible way to achieve the 
same results without restricting competition, the restrictive means are 
invalid under Article 81(2) because they are not the least restrictive means 
possible. A court is unlikely to find that the small economic benefit result-
ing from the implementation of the 6+5 Rule outweighs the disregard of one 
of the four basic freedoms of the EC Treaty. Likewise, a court is unlikely to 
see the 6+5 Rule as the least restrictive way to restore some economic bal-
ance in football since, as Part V discusses, there are other feasible ways to 
move toward this goal.
106
Blatter argues that at least the financial gap between teams would 
narrow with the application of the 6+5 Rule. He says that “[r]ich clubs will 
stay rich but those less well off will stand a fighting chance, that’s all we 
ask for.”
Even if FIFA imple-
ments the 6+5 Rule, the top clubs would still be able to secure and hoard the 
best players at the expense of the other clubs. There would still be an imbal-
ance, as the 6+5 Rule would drive up the salaries of national players, and 
teams like Newcastle would struggle to purchase national players who could 
compete with more affluent teams like Chelsea. 
107
103 Id. art. 81(3)(a).
This may be true, but Blatter understates the negative impacts 
on other aspects of the game. If leagues like the EPL have to institute the 
6+5 Rule, EPL teams will not be free to build teams comprised of the best 
players they can afford, but instead they will have to comprise teams of the 
best English players they can afford. With twenty teams in the top English 
league alone and numerous lower leagues in England, there is simply not 
104 Schiera, supra note 51, at 737.
105 Id. (emphasis added).
106 Lee, supra note 17, at 1300 (citing Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Ass’n (ASBL) v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995)).
107 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
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enough English talent to go around.108
In essence, Blatter seeks to achieve equality through a “dumbing 
down” of the league as a whole. This would destroy the top leagues that 
draw fans from all over the world because the teams within those leagues 
display the best play in the world.
The 6+5 Rule will force teams to 
play players who, under the current structure, teams would not consider 
talented enough for league play. The overall level of talent on teams will 
decrease as a result.
109 The dangers of Blatter’s proposed solu-
tion are echoed in a short story by Kurt Vonnegut. In Harrison Bergeron,
Vonnegut presents a world where the desire for equality had reached absurd 
ends.110 In this satirical depiction of an equal world, the Handicapper Gen-
eral is tasked with ensuring that all individuals are fitted with devices to 
guarantee that no one is any smarter or physically superior than anyone 
else.111
C. Blatter’s Third Justification: Lack of Development of Local Players
Vonnegut shows that true equality comes at a great price. Similarly, 
Blatter fails to realize that by instituting his plan he will become the Handi-
capper General of the football world. 
Blatter’s third justification for the need for the proposed 6+5 Rule is 
that local, young football players will not receive sufficient training to make 
them marketable as professional football players without the rule. Blatter 
argues that unless FIFA requires clubs to eventually use local talent through 
nationality requirements, clubs will not recruit and train local talent.112 Lo-
cal clubs’ failure to recruit and train local talent will also negatively impact 
national teams since national teams are comprised exclusively of national 
players. If local clubs do not train local talent, national teams will not have 
competitive players.113
There are several flaws with this justification. First, many argue that 
a disincentive to train local youths does not actually exist. There is no rea-
son why the ability to also hire foreign players would necessarily cause 
clubs, which already train young players on youth teams, to suddenly ex-
108 Premierleague.com, About Us, Our Relationship with the Clubs, http://www.
premierleague.com/page/Contact.
109 See, e.g., Caldow, supra note 13, at 58. 
110 See KURT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7–14
(2006), available at http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/hb.html.
111 Id.
112 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
113 See Gary, supra note 38, at 321–22 (declaring that European football fans “worry that 
the influx of foreign players will thwart the development of local talent to stock their national 
teams for World Cup play.”).
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clude domestic youth players in those training squads.114 On the contrary, 
there is some evidence to support that the ability to hire foreign players does 
not injure youth development programs. A strong example of such evidence 
is in France. Compared to other leagues in Europe, the French leagues’ sala-
ries are low.115 As a result, the best French players leave and play in other 
European leagues, and the French league has many foreign players.116 Ac-
cording to Blatter’s reasoning, this should mean that the youth development 
programs in France are suffering, but the opposite is true. The French have 
one of the most renowned and successful youth development plans, and the 
French development plan is credited with the success of many French 
players.117
A second flaw in Blatter’s local player development justification is 
that it is based on the general assumption that “foreign players will be supe-
rior to domestic players and will inevitably replace domestic talent.”118 It is 
wrong to automatically assume that domestic players cannot compete and 
need regulatory help to succeed. Domestic talent can not only compete with 
foreign talent, but also an influx of foreign talent may actually motivate 
domestic talent to “work harder and perfect their skills.”119
A final flaw with the local player development justification for the 
implementation of the 6+5 Rule is that solving the youth development prob-
lem by instituting nationality based restrictions is not the least restrictive 
way to attain better balance. Similar to the analysis of Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty, if there is another way to accomplish the same goal without 
running afoul of employee rights under the EC Treaty, then the restrictive 
option cannot be the correct option.120
D. Blatter’s Argument for a General Sports Exception
As Part V will discuss, there are other 
ways to address this problem without violating essential rights and guaran-
tees under the EC Treaty. 
Blatter argues that EU law should not apply to sports because sports 
are different than other economic activities.121
114 See Stephen Weatherill, Resisting the Pressures of “Americanization”: The Influence of 
European Community Law on the “European Sport Model”, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &
DISP. RESOL. 37, 53 (2000).
He repeatedly has expressed 
115 Duffy, supra note 37, at 313.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Penn, supra note 40, at 225 (arguing that increased competition from EU and foreign 
players motivates EU athletes to perfect their skills).
119 Id.
120 EC Treaty, supra note 10, arts. 81–82.
121 See, e.g., Baynes, supra note 68.
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his view that the EU must recognize the specificity of sports.122 He bases 
much of his argument on the recognition of the “specific nature of sport” in 
the Lisbon Treaty, which was scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 
2009.123 Blatter said that he wanted to use the “legal basis of the Treaty of 
Lisbon” to legally support his 6+5 Rule, and FIFA argues that the “specific 
nature of sport” means that sports are above EU rules that govern economic 
activity.124 This stems from a belief that government regulations serve as 
unwanted obstacles to the operations of sports, as expressed by Blatter’s 
alleged year-round struggle against “governmental interference in the affairs 
of Member Associations . . . .”125
Blatter’s argument is partially true in that sports are unique in sev-
eral ways, and, therefore, traditional rules may not be a perfect fit for sports 
organizations. He is also correct in that the EU should recognize that sports 
have inherent characteristics that make an inflexible application of EU law 
inappropriate. In fact, the EU recognized the unique nature of sports in No-
vember of 2007 when the EC took steps to clarify its sports policy in the 
White Paper on Sport (White Paper).126 First, the White Paper explicitly 
recognized the “specificity of sport.”127 Pedro Velázquez, Deputy Head of 
the EU’s Sports Unit, argues that the White Paper noted that “sport’s specif-
ic nature means it should be exempt from EU law in a number of key areas 
such as the acceptance of gender-segregation.”128 In addition to rules go-
verning gender, the Commission recognized that rules applying to multiple 
ownership of teams, transfer policies, and anti-doping policies may not vi-
olate EU principles “provided that their anti-competitive effects, if any, are 
inherent and proportionate to the objective pursued.”129
122 Id.
Here the Commis-
sion is, as Blatter wishes, recognizing that sports do not always fit easily 
into traditional legal frameworks.
123 Euro Cup, supra note 14. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) at 
95, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7294/7294.pdf (stat-
ing “[t]he Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function.”).
124 Euro Cup, supra note 14 (stating “FIFA argues that the mention of the ‘specific nature 
of sport’ in the new Lisbon Treaty means that football is not concerned by those rules.”).
125 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
126 See White Paper, supra note 31.
127 See id. § 4.1.
128 Marcus Hay, EU Interest in Sport Gets Cautious Welcome, PLAY THE GAME 43 (2008),
available at http://www. playthegame.org/upload/magazine2007/pdf/sections/
playthegamemagazine07sportandlaw.pdf (quoting Pedro Velázquez, Deputy Head of the 
EU’s Sports Unit). 
129 White Paper, supra note 31, § 4.1.
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Where Blatter takes his argument too far is when he argues that be-
cause of the unique nature of sports, sports should be exempt from all EC 
Treaty provisions.130 The Commission’s White Paper flatly dismissed this 
view when it stated, “the specificity of sport will continue to be recognized, 
but it cannot be construed so as to justify a general exemption from the ap-
plication of EU law.”131 Here, the Commission is categorically rejecting the 
notion of a general sports exemption. Instead, the Commission stressed that 
any determination of whether a sporting rule and EU law are compatible 
“can only be made on a case-by-case basis . . . .”132
While Blatter can argue that certain sporting rules are necessary be-
cause of the unique nature of sports, his argument will fail if the sporting 
rule conflicts with the basic principles of the EC Treaty. Some principles of 
EU law are so elementary that creating an exception would undermine the 
essence of the EC Treaty. One commentator argues that “[f]reedom of 
movement for workers and the abolition of nationality discrimination are 
pervasive themes of the EC Treaty” as they directly relate to one of the fun-
damental freedoms of the EC Treaty—the free movement of persons.133
These principles are cornerstones of EU policy and cannot be brushed aside 
so easily. In the White Paper, the Commission specifically reaffirmed its 
stance on the strict enforcement of anti-discrimination policies in sports 
when it called all “Member States and sport organizations to address dis-
crimination based on nationality in all sports.”134 Furthermore, the Commis-
sion stated it would “combat discrimination in sport through political dialo-
gue with Member States, recommendations, structured dialogue with sport 
stakeholders, and infringement procedures when appropriate.”135
While Blatter believes that he has “good arguments to convince 
those in Europe,” the Commission has made its stance clear. Blatter’s re-
liance on the specificity of sports as a way to evade EU law will fail because 
the difference between sports and other economic activity is not so pro-
nounced as to undermine the essential principles of the EC Treaty. The 
Commission’s report stated that the European Community saw sports as a 
The is-
suance of the White Paper on Sport is a clear expression of the Commis-
sion’s firm stance that the specificity of sport does not excuse sporting or-
ganizations from their obligations regarding free movement of workers and 
anti-discrimination under the EC Treaty.
130 See, e.g., Baynes, supra note 68.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Lee, supra note 17, at 1303.
134 White Paper, supra note 31, § 4.2 n. 39.
135 Id.
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way to “share our values with other parts of the world.”136
IV. INADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
This includes the 
values of free movement and anti-discrimination. Thus, the Commission has 
made it clear that Blatter and FIFA cannot cling to the specificity of sport to 
avoid the law. 
Since FIFA’s 6+5 Rule fails to meet its objectives and is a clear vi-
olation of the EC Treaty, it is necessary to find alternative solutions to ad-
dress the problems plaguing European football today. While some have 
posited solutions like UEFA’s Home-Grown Rule, none have presented a 
workable solution that would address all of the interrelated problems that 
exist. This section discusses the inadequate solutions of (1) the UEFA’s 
Home-Grown Rule; (2) salary caps; and (3) “Farm Teams.”
A. UEFA’s Home-Grown Rule: Only a Partial Fix
One solution proposed by UEFA is the institution of the Home-
Grown Rule in which teams would be required to have a minimum of two 
players trained in their own player-development program and two players 
trained in “the development program of another team within the same na-
tional association.”137 There is no requirement to play these players in any 
games; they just need to be members of the teams’ twenty-five man ros-
ter.138 The Home-Grown Rule does not discriminate based on nationality, 
and that is what prompted the EC to accept this rule as within the EC 
Treaty.139
While the Home-Grown Rule has passed the Commission’s review, 
it does little to address all of the problems facing European football. It may 
address one area, youth development, because clubs would not be able to 
purchase players who have already developed their skills and ignore youth 
training.140
136 See id. § 2.7.
However, the Home-Grown Rule does nothing to address the 
imbalance between clubs on the economic and competitive level. Blatter 
argues correctly that “the richest clubs would merely have to buy players at 
137 Penn, supra note 40, at 226 ((citing uefa.com, Local Training Debate Moves Online, 
Feb. 6, 2005, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=65536/newsid=261004.html) (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2009)).
138 See Penn, supra note 40, at 226 ((citing uefa.com, Local Training Debate Moves On-
line, Feb. 6, 2005, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=65536/newsid=261004.html) 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009)).
139 IRISH TIMES, supra note 12. 
140 Richard Williams & Alex Haffner, FIFA Quotas Ruled Offside?, 158 NEW L.J. (2008),
available at http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/fifa-quotas-ruled-offside (last vi-
sited Sept. 28, 2009).
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an even younger age than they are currently doing.”141
B. Salary Cap: Another EC Treaty Violation
These top clubs 
would still be able to buy and regularly play the most expensive and most 
skilled players and dominate their leagues. For this reason, UEFA’s Home-
Grown Rule is not a complete solution.
Many have argued that the answer to the economic imbalance be-
tween clubs in European football is to institute a salary cap. Salary caps 
limit the total dollar amount that teams can put toward player salaries. 142
Salary caps exist, in one form or another, in many sporting organizations in 
the U.S.143 The National Football League (NFL) best demonstrates the suc-
cessful use of the salary cap in U.S. sports. In the twenty-one years prior to 
the institution of the salary cap in the NFL, seven of the twenty-eight teams 
in the league won the Super Bowl twenty times.144 This was a time of 
American Football “dynasties” like the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Dallas 
Cowboys.145 In the thirteen years following the institution of the salary cap 
in the NFL, nine different teams have won the Super Bowl.146
However, a salary cap is an unworkable solution for European foot-
ball. While it does not violate Article 39 (ex 48) in that it contains no re-
strictions on players based on nationality, a salary cap would run afoul of 
other EC Treaty provisions. Most likely, a salary cap would violate Article 
81 (ex 85) of the EC Treaty. As previously discussed, Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty contains three parts. The first part, Article 81(1), prohibits any asso-
ciation from taking actions that “have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market . . . .”
This suggests 
that a salary cap can be an effective way to restore competitive balance in 
sports.
147 A salary cap restricts teams’ ability to attain the most com-
petitive players and is an act purposely designed to restrict or distort compe-
tition within leagues. A salary cap would fall under Article 81(1); therefore, 
a salary cap would be automatically void under Article 81(2), the second 
part of Article 81.148
141 FIFA.com, supra note 8.
Finally, a salary cap does not fit the exception under 
the third part of the Article, Article 81(3), which allows for a distortion of 
142 See, e.g., Schiera, supra note 51, at 725.
143 See, e.g., id. at 722, 724 (citing Chronological History of the Modern National Football 
League, http://www.vaughantech.com/nfl.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009)).
144 Schiera, supra note 51, at 724.
145 Id. at n.108. 
146 Id. at 724.
147 EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 81(1).
148 Id. art. 81(2).
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competition if that distortion benefits the industry and consumers.149 One 
could argue that a salary cap fits the exception because it corrects the eco-
nomic imbalance in football and thus benefits consumers, but there is a 
second requirement before the Article 81(3) exception applies. Article 
81(3)(a) requires not only a benefit to the industry and its consumers, but 
also that the action is “indispensable to the attainment of these objectives.” 
150
C. Farm Teams: Destroying a Distinctive Characteristic of the 
European Sports Model
If there is a less restrictive way to accomplish the same goals, the excep-
tion does not apply. Since a hard cap is such a severe restriction, it would be 
unlikely that the Commission would accept that there are no less restrictive 
policies.
Some have proposed that European football leagues should incorpo-
rate a farm-system similar to that in American baseball. A farm system 
works in American baseball by the major league teams sponsoring minor 
league teams.151 The minor league teams recruit, develop, and train players, 
then the major league teams choose players from those minor league 
teams.152 Proponents argue that the farm system would foster youth devel-
opment and remedy economic imbalance in European football because in-
come from the upper level clubs would channel into a fund for the lower 
level clubs to pull from, so no one upper level club could dominate the sys-
tem.153 The lower level clubs would then use the funds to develop their 
players since these players are the primary pool of new talent for the upper 
level clubs.154
On the surface, the farm team system seems like an attractive solu-
tion which would address all of the challenges facing European football, but 
this solution comes at a great price. Implementing farm teams would de-
stroy one of the essentially European features of the European Sports Mod-
el: the promotion and relegation system. Promotion and relegation is a sys-
tem by which the lowest club teams in a league are relegated, or demoted, to 
the league level below while the top teams from that lower league level are 
promoted to the higher league.155
149 Id. art 81(3).
For example, at the end of the 2008–2009 
150 Id. art. 81(3)(a).
151 Minorleaguenews.com, Farm System Ranking, http://minorleaguenews.com/baseball/
affiliated/farms/NLfarm.html (ranking major league sponsored farm systems).
152 See Lee, supra note 17, at 1314.
153 See id.
154 Id.
155 World Sport, Explainer: How Relegation Works, CNN.COM, May, 18, 2009, http://
edition.cnn.com/2009/SPORT/football/05/18/relegation.explainer/index.html.
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English football season, the three lowest-ranked teams in the EPL were 
Middlesboro, West Bromwich, and Newcastle.156 As a result, these three 
teams were relegated to the league below the EPL, the Championship 
League. To balance the numbers, the top three teams from the Champion-
ship League—Wolverhamption, Burnley, and Birmingham City—were 
promoted to the EPL.157
The promotion and relegation system is a characteristic of the Eu-
ropean Sports Model that makes it distinct from the American model, and it 
is one with enormous benefits. Fans indentify with their teams by locality, 
and their hopes and dreams are tied up with the possibility of moving up 
into the top league. For proof of how enormous a lift communities receive 
when one of their local teams secures a top spot and earns a promotion to 
the EPL, one need look no further than the celebration that followed the 
promotion of the Hull City Tigers at the end of the 20072008 season. On 
May 26, 2008, Hull City braced for thousands of fans to line its streets and 
cheer the players who secured promotion for the team to the EPL for the 
following season.158 Plans for the celebration included a parade through the 
town in an open-top bus to the city center for a Hull celebration.159
Yet if European football would implement a farm team system like 
that in American baseball, it would destroy the promotion and relegation 
system, and, in turn, destroy the hopes and dreams of thousands of football 
fans. Lower league club teams would have to affiliate with an upper league 
team that could pull up players from those lower league teams whenever 
there was a need or a player showed promise. A farm system would effec-
tively destroy any chance lower league teams would have of building a sta-
ble and strong team to compete for the top ranking spots in their league and 
achieve promotion. Lower league teams and their fans would be, in effect, 
permanently relegated, and this would kill the hope and spirit of many small 
town clubs. 
The joy 
in that town that day was a direct result of the European Model’s promotion 
and relegation system. 
156 Andrew Jordan, Middlesboro, Newcastle Added to EPL Relegation Heap, BLEACHER 
REPORT, May 24, 2009, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/182747-english-premier-league-
relegation-2009.
157 Jordan, supra note 156. See also Burnley Beat Sheffield Utd in Championship Playoff,
UKREUTERS.COM, May 25, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE54O3CF20090525.
158 ThisIsHullAndEastriding.co.uk, Hull City Promotion: Homecoming Parade Route 
Through the City, http://www.thisishullandeastriding.co.uk/environment/Hull-City-
promotion-Homecoming-parade-route-city/article-180500-detail/article.html (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2009).
159 Id.
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V. A UNIFIED SOLUTION
While the Home-Grown Rule, salary caps, and farm teams are all 
imperfect solutions, there is a way to structure a network of programs based 
on practices in American sports to address all of Blatter’s issues and im-
prove football. First, a revenue-sharing system like that currently operating 
in American Major League Baseball (MLB) would redistribute wealth be-
tween the large and small market clubs. Second, a luxury tax, similar to 
those assessed in MLB and the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
would also help level the inequalities between clubs without forcing the top 
clubs to dilute the talent they display on the pitch each week. Finally, league 
sponsored development leagues like the NBA’s D-League could address 
Blatter’s other concern that domestic youth are not given opportunities to 
learn the skills and develop the talent they will need to compete in the 
world’s top leagues. A combination of these three practices would remedy 
the ills in European Football today.
A. Revenue-Sharing Success in American Baseball
One way that European football can address the disparity between a 
few dominating clubs and the rest of the league’s clubs is to institute a reve-
nue-sharing system. Revenue-sharing systems are designed to “increase the 
competitive balance within the league.”160 Under the revenue-sharing sys-
tem, each club in the league contributes a set percentage of its season’s in-
come to the league organization.161 The more a club profits, the more it has 
to give. Those funds are then redistributed among the league clubs.162 Under 
the revenue-sharing system, a club that is less profitable would have to con-
tribute less but would receive more of a share of the redistributed funds. 
Revenue-sharing, therefore, preserves “the competitive and financial bal-
ance between clubs.”163
Revenue-sharing plans are not without their naysayers, especially 
top officials at the most profitable teams. In 2005, New York Yankees own-
er George Steinbrenner expressed his exasperation with the MLB’s revenue-
sharing system when he said, “[w]e keep carrying everybody else and get 
outvoted (by the other teams) all the time. But that’s the way it is; it’s like a 
socialist state.”164
160 Shula Neuman, Major League Baseball: Sharing Revenue, Not Success, Oct. 12, 2007, 
http://news-info.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/10292.html.
Others argue that rather than making leagues more com-
161 Lee, supra note 17, at 1313.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Hal Bodley, Revenue Sharing Paying Off, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/baseball/columnist/bodley/2005-04-07-bodley-revenue-sharing_x.htm 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
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petitive, revenue-sharing plans decrease competition by allowing lower lev-
el teams to become complacent knowing that they will still receive the 
funds they need to survive from the system even if they do not perform 
well.165 One such critic of revenue-sharing systems is Michael Lewis, Assis-
tant Professor of Marketing at Washington University’s Olin Business 
School.166 Lewis argues that revenue-sharing creates a “negative effect on 
the incentives to invest in talent in small-market franchises.”167 Lewis 
presents the Tampa Bay Rays as an example of a team that under-invests in 
its team and instead chooses to “grow the bottom line through revenue-
sharing.”168
While the critics paint a dire portrait of sports under revenue-
sharing, the reality is the system does work. According to MLB Commis-
sioner Bud Selig, the institution of revenue-sharing in MLB has “changed 
the economic landscape of the sport.”169 Selig counters critics like Lewis 
and says that teams are not just pocketing the money.170 For the 2005 sea-
son, five teams increased their salaries by thirty-three percent or more. 171
The teams are spending the money and increasing payrolls, and this has 
brought new, young, talented players into the league.172 Selig stresses that 
the benefits of revenue-sharing have not only increased player salaries, but 
also spilled over into other areas of the game. For example, TV ratings and 
attendance have also improved.173
Despite these gains, critics like Lewis still contend that revenue-
sharing has not produced the expected results.174 Focusing solely on crunch-
ing the numbers, Lewis builds a strong argument that, mathematically, 
teams like the Tampa Bay Rays may make more money just taking the rev-
enue-sharing income and not building a more competitive team.175
165 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 160 (arguing that the goal of instituting revenue sharing 
in the Major League Baseball team was to increase the competitive balance within the 
league).
Howev-
er, what critics like Lewis fail to realize is that teams are motivated to suc-
ceed by more than money. Players want to win. Owners want to win. Fans 
want to win. There is no better example of this than the one Lewis himself 
presents in his argument against revenue-sharing. In 2007, Lewis insisted 
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Bodley, supra note 164.
170 Id. (quoting Commissioner Bud Selig).
171 Id. (quoting the results of a USA Today annual survey).
172 Id. (quoting Commissioner Bud Selig).
173 Id.
174 See Neuman, supra note 160. 
175 Id.
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that the Tampa Bay Rays had no incentive to win under the current revenue-
sharing scheme in MLB and would instead prefer to sit back and collect the 
shared profits.176
While hindsight is twenty-twenty, what the Tampa Bay Rays exam-
ple shows is that revenue-sharing is an effective way to bring greater eco-
nomic equality between teams and greater competition on the playing field. 
Overall, revenue-sharing helps level the playing field between the richest 
and poorest clubs because it provides the lower teams with the economic 
ability to recruit and train more talented players. This gives lower teams a 
better chance of competing on the same plane as the richest clubs.
His theory cannot, however, explain how the Rays ended 
up in the 2008 World Series. 
B. Luxury Tax: A Better Alternative to the Salary Cap
While revenue-sharing helps raise the competitiveness of the bot-
tom teams in the league, an economic gap may still remain. While the poor-
er teams can now purchase and train highly skilled players, they cannot af-
ford to fill every seat on the bench with million-dollar players like the Yan-
kees or Chelsea. Revenue-sharing goes a long way to bridge the affluence 
gap, but adding a luxury tax like that in MLB and the NBA would narrow 
the expanse even further. 
Luxury tax systems are often confused with salary cap systems, but 
there is a distinction. A luxury tax does not limit or cap the amount that 
teams can spend on players’ salaries.177 It is more of a salary threshold than 
a cap. Under a luxury tax system, a salary threshold is set, and, when a team 
exceeds that threshold, it must pay a penalty tax to the league.178 Those pe-
nalty tax funds are then redistributed among all of the teams in the league 
whose salaries remain below the threshold.179 This type of system is de-
signed to account for exclusive top teams who seem to have endless sources 
of revenue.180
For example, in the NBA there is a complicated formula of limits 
and exceptions designed to control team spending, but once the league cal-
culates each team’s spending on player salaries, the league applies its luxury 
tax.181
176 Id.
Under the NBA luxury tax system, teams must pay one dollar to the 
177 SportsCity.com, NBA Salary Cap, http://www.sportscity.com/NBA/Salary-Cap (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2009) (describing the luxury tax instituted by the National Basketball Asso-
ciation in 1999).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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league for every dollar they exceed the salary threshold for that season.182
For example, in 20072008, the league threshold for salaries was 
$67,865,000, and the Dallas Mavericks’ payroll was $79,351,704.183 Since 
the team exceeded the threshold for the season, the Mavericks owed the 
league $11,486,704. 184 The NBA would collect these funds from the Mave-
ricks and pass them on to teams who did not exceed the threshold.185
Instituting a luxury tax system in European football would address 
an economic disparity that revenue-sharing alone cannot correct. There are 
some teams with seemingly bottomless pockets, and a share of their profits 
cannot begin to dent their spending potential. A perfect example is Chelsea, 
a team owned by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich.186 Abramovich 
has not held back in his desire to win at all costs, and he spent £578 million 
of his own money on the club over the course of four-and-a-half years.187
Another benefit of a luxury tax is that, unlike a salary cap, a luxury 
tax would most likely pass Article 81 of the EC Treaty. Under the three 
parts of Article 81, a luxury tax would pass the first part, Article 81(1), 
since it does not force clubs to limit their spending on players’ salaries.
Even with revenue-sharing, Chelsea will always be able to massively out-
spend other teams in the EPL. A luxury tax, while perhaps not curbing Ab-
ramovich’s spending, would at least pass on some of the wealth to teams 
which cannot afford to pay an exorbitant amount of money to secure the 
greatest players in the world. 
188
Therefore, the EC will not view a luxury tax as a real restriction on competi-
tion.189 This would mean that a luxury tax would not be automatically void 
under Article 81(2), the second part of Article 81.190 Even if the Commis-
sion would see a luxury tax as restricting competition under Article 81(1), a 
luxury tax is far more likely to fit within the exception under Article 81(3), 
the third part of Article 81. Article 81(3) provides an exception for measures 
that violate Article 81(1) if those measures promote economic progress and 
allow consumers to share in the benefits.191
182 Id.
Also, Article 81(3) only allows 
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 The World’s Billionaires, #15 Roman Abramovich, FORBES.COM, Mar. 3, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08_Roman-Abramovich_DG3G.html.
187 Charles Sale, Roman Takes his Chelsea Spending to £578m, THE DAILY MAIL, Feb. 21, 
2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-517390/Roman-takes-Chelsea-
spending-578m.html. 
188 See Schiera, supra note 51, at 736.
189 Id.
190 See EC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 81(2).
191 Id. art. 81(3).
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measures that are “indispensable to the attainment of” those objectives.192 It 
is under Article 81(3) that a luxury tax also has an advantage over a salary 
cap. The Commission is unlikely to see a salary cap as “indispensible to the 
attainment” of economic balance within the league. Contrastingly, it would 
be much easier to argue that a luxury tax is the “least restrictive means of 
creating such benefits”; a consideration in any Article 81(3) analysis.193
The beauty of both a luxury tax and revenue-sharing is that, unlike a 
salary cap, a luxury tax and a revenue-sharing system brings greater eco-
nomic equality to teams in a league but does so without destroying the qual-
ity of play for top level clubs. Where a salary cap brings down the competi-
tiveness of top clubs so that lower clubs have a chance to compete, revenue-
sharing and luxury tax systems allow top clubs to continue to play at the 
same level. Additionally, the redistributed profits and taxes raise the level of 
play for the bottom teams. Tampa made it to the World Series, but the Yan-
kees are still stocked with highly-paid players. Under a combination of 
these two schemes, European football leagues can improve the economic 
and athletic competitiveness of their clubs without “dumbing down” power-
house dream teams like England’s Chelsea, Spain’s Real Madrid, and Ita-
ly’s AC Milan. This benefits the clubs, the league, and the fans, and solves 
the first of Blatter’s two legitimate concerns that serve as his justification 
for the 6+5 Rule by addressing the economic imbalance in football leagues 
and the dominance of a select few clubs.
For 
this reason, a luxury tax is a far better solution than a salary cap. 
C. League-Sponsored Development Leagues
While instituting a revenue-sharing plan and a luxury tax will ad-
dress Blatter’s first legitimate concern—the economic and competitive im-
balance between clubs—another American practice can address his second 
legitimate concern of the lack of youth development. Blatter feels the 6+5 
Rule is also needed to address the lack of development of local players be-
cause teams can purchase already developed foreign players, but the Ameri-
can NBA provides an example of a successful program that could address 
this issue without violating the EC Treaty.
In 2001, Commissioner of the NBA David Stern announced the 
formation of the NBA Development League (D-League).194
192 Id. art. 81(3)(a).
The D-League 
recruits young players through “a draft, player assignments, allocations, 
193 Schiera, supra note 51, at 737.
194 Maury Brown, D-League Sets Expansion Draft, Complete List of Players, http://www.
bizofbasketball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=710:d-league-sets-
expansion-draft-complete-list-of-players&catid=54:d-league-news&Itemid=74 (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2009). 
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tryouts and a returning player pool.”195 Local tryouts take place all over the 
country, and players may then be invited to training camps where they have 
a chance to prove themselves worthy of a spot on a team.196
The D-League has developed team affiliations with NBA teams 
since 2005.
This provides 
young players, who might not otherwise have a chance of discovery or 
access to training programs, with an opportunity to develop their skills and 
come to the attention of the league. NBA teams can then select players of 
promise and talent from the ranks of the D-League.
197 While these affiliations seem to be moving more toward a 
farm system arrangement like that in the MLB,198 there are distinct differ-
ences. While a farm system would be incompatible with the European Mod-
el of promotion and relegation, the differences in the D-League avoid this 
conflict. First, the players in the D-League do not sign a contract with any 
particular team in the D-League.199 Instead, they sign a general contract 
with the league itself; therefore, the players are not affiliated with any par-
ticular NBA team.200 A player in the D-League is also released from his 
obligations under that contract if any NBA team offers him a contract.201
The NBA D-League, though relatively new, has produced dramatic 
results. As of the start of the 20082009 NBA season, fifteen percent of the 
players in the NBA have played in the D-League.
This provides more flexibility for players than the MLB system where play-
ers can only be called up to the associated team.
202 This shows that the D-
League is working because it is finding and developing talent worthy of 
competing at the highest level. The D-League has not only discovered ta-
lented players, but it has also brought other talent to the NBA. For example, 
nineteen coaches and seventeen referees have moved from the D-League 
into the NBA since its formation.203
A system similar to the NBA’s D-League could address the prob-
lem of player development that Blatter feels justifies his 6+5 Rule.204
195 NBA.com, NBA D-League Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nba.com/dleague/
Lea-
gues like the EPL would contribute funding for the development league that 
would scout and develop young talent in the geographic location of the 
fan_faq.html#fanfaq1 (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
196 Id.
197 Brown, supra note 194. 
198 See Lee, supra note 17, at 1314.
199 NBA.com, supra note 195.
200 Id.
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league. This would develop the national talent from which professional 
league clubs could recruit. Local talent will no longer be overlooked as 
Blatter fears. These leagues would also not disturb the promotion and rele-
gation system like a farm team system because the development league 
would not be part of the professional league structure. They have no hope of 
promotion because they are a completely separate league. Players in the 
development league could move to any professional level club if selected, 
even those clubs in the lower levels of the promotion and relegation ladder. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Every problem has a solution; the real challenge is to find the right 
one. As 2010 rapidly approaches, finding the right solutions to the problems 
facing European football becomes increasingly crucial. If circumstances do 
not change, UEFA will find itself in the middle of a battle it cannot win. On 
the one hand, in 2010, FIFA will likely insist that UEFA begin implement-
ing the first phase of the 6+5 Rule or risk losing its affiliation with the 
world governing body.205 On the other hand, the EU has made it clear that it 
would hold violators of EC Treaty provisions legally responsible.206
FIFA President Sepp Blatter recognizes that problems exist in foot-
ball that allow the wealthiest teams to dominate the sport and allow some 
potential talent to go undiscovered. There is no question that Blatter’s inten-
tions are noble, but, unfortunately, his vision is clouded. He fails to see that 
his proposed solutions are the wrong ones, and his blind faith that things 
will go his way in the end prevents him from seeing the collision course he 
is on. As a result, he has closed himself and FIFA off from alternative, 
workable solutions.
As the global governing body for football, FIFA should welcome
global integration in the world of football instead of attempting to stifle it. 
Instead of limiting player mobility and the internationalization of teams in 
leagues around the world, FIFA should embrace these changes. Just as FIFA 
should embrace global integration on the football pitches of the world, so 
should FIFA look to policies and programs around the world to find the 
right solutions to the problems facing football. Oddly enough, the right solu-
tions exist in a nation that ranks relatively low in the hierarchy of global 
football. While Americans cheer loudly for the Steelers, buy peanuts and 
hot dogs at Mets games, and pay outrageous prices for the latest athletic 
shoe sponsored by their favorite NBA star, “soccer” has struggled to garner 
205 IRISH TIMES, supra note 12 (stating that FIFA President Sepp Blatter “said he would 
push ahead with his plans despite the EU executive’s strongest warning yet over the imple-
mentation of the so-called ‘6+5 rule’”).
206 Id.
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a following; therefore, the United States seems an unlikely place to find the 
solutions to solve the problems facing “the world’s game.”
Despite this seeming contradiction, U.S. sports can help football 
overcome its obstacles but only if FIFA, under the leadership of President 
Blatter, can broaden its view and look for the right solutions. If not, FIFA 
will continue down its current path and reach the inevitable conflict at the 
end. If this happens, the resulting battle could mar the pitches of football for 
years to come and make FIFA a destructive force in football instead of the 
unifying force it was designed to be.

